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T HE  YA L E  L AW  J O UR NA L  F O R U M 
N O V E M B E R  1 6 ,  2 0 2 1  
 
 
Agonistic Privacy & Equitable Democracy 
Scott  Skinner-Thompson 
 
abstract.  This Essay argues that legal privacy protections—which enable in-
dividuals to control their visibility within public space—play a vital role in dis-
rupting the subordinating, antidemocratic impacts of surveillance and should be 
at the forefront of efforts to reform the operation of both digital and physical 
public space. Robust privacy protections are a touchstone for empowering mem-
bers of different marginalized groups with the ability to safely participate in both 
the physical and digital public squares, while also preserving space for vibrant 
subaltern counterpublics. By increasing heterogeneity within the public sphere, 
privacy can also help decrease polarization by breaking down echo chambers and 
enabling the healthy contestation of ideas.   
introduction  
Privacy is paramount to ensuring that the public sphere is an equitable, het-
erogeneous environment where ideas can be contested, democracy realized, and 
society enhanced.1 As it stands, both the physical public square and the digital 
public sphere are characterized by unequal access, harassment, surveillance, and 
violence.2 The harms originating in each context rebound and intensify as the 
 
1. As used here, the terms public square and public sphere refer to “a set of physical or mediated 
spaces where people can gather and share information, debate opinions, and tease out their 
political interests and social needs with other participants.” Catherine R. Squires, Rethinking 
the Black Public Sphere: An Alternative Vocabulary for Multiple Public Spheres, 12 COMMC’N THE-
ORY 446, 448 (2002). 
2. See Monica Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 717 (2020) (documenting 
the many forms of violence and control that work to exclude Black people from certain phys-
ical spaces); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 13-17 (2014) 
agonistic privacy & equitable democracy 
455 
law o�en fails to appreciate the interconnectedness between digital and physical 
space.3 For example, surveillance of physical space can lead to online harass-
ment4 or doxing,5 which can in turn create tangible harms such as anxiety, men-
tal-health injuries, and loss of employment.6 When used by government actors, 
digital surveillance of physical space can lead to (o�en baseless) incarceration 
and the chilling of expressive liberties.7 This cycle harms individuals, particu-
larly those who belong to marginalized groups.8 But it also imposes group 
harms, pushing and erasing entire segments of society from the hegemonic pub-
lic sphere, contributing to homogeneity of identities in public.9 This in turn cre-
ates societal-level harms to democracy, including conformity of ideas within the 
dominant public sphere, with marginalized groups effectively segregated from 
that space—ultimately contributing to political polarization by reinforcing echo 
chambers rather than increasing heterogeneous interactions.10  
 
(documenting use of nonconsensual pornography as means of harassment against women); 
Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: “Revenge Porn” in Gay Online Communi-
ties, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 987, 988 (2019) (noting that queer men are disproportionately vic-
timized by revenge porn). 
3. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 245 (2007) (cataloging de-
bates about whether cyberspace is exceptional and/or distinct from physical space, while em-
phasizing that our networked activities create embodied impacts and effects, further exposing 
“the constructedness of embodied space”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyber-
space, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1644-46 (1999) (underscoring examples where the lack of digital 
privacy erodes physical privacy). 
4. Alice Chapman, Note, Privacy Rights and Abortion Outing: A Proposal for Using Common-Law 
Torts to Protect Abortion Patients and Staff, 112 YALE L.J. 1545, 1546 (2003) (describing use of 
video cameras to capture images of women entering women’s health clinics followed by online 
harassment). 
5. Colin J.A. Oldberg, Note, Organizational Doxing: Disaster on the Doorstep, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 
181, 183 (2016) (defining doxing as the posting of personally identifiable information about a 
person on the internet for purposes of galvanizing social opprobrium). 
6. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 69-71 (2009). 
7. E.g., Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recogni-
tion-misidentify-jail.html [https://perma.cc/4XPT-4MVC]. 
8. Such groups include queer folk, racial minorities, immigrants, religious minorities, the eco-
nomically subjugated, and others. Mary A. Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 425, 441 (2017); SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON, PRIVACY AT THE MARGINS 17-44 (2021); 
KHIARA BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 5, 12 (2017). 
9. BRIDGES, supra note 8, at 96; cf. Franks, supra note 8, at 429 (“[S]urveillance based on perni-
cious and illegitimate prejudices towards certain groups inflicts discriminatory social harms 
on society in addition to individual harms.”). 
10. See generally Alfredo J. Morales, Xiaowen Dong, Yaneer Bar-Yam & Alex ‘Sandy’ Pentland, 
Segregation and Polarization in Urban Areas, 6 ROYAL SOC’Y OPEN SCI., Oct. 23, 2019. 
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As I argue in this Essay, legal privacy protections—which enable individuals 
to control their visibility within public space—play a vital role in disrupting this 
subordinating, antidemocratic process and should be at the forefront of efforts 
to reform the operation of both digital and physical public spaces. Although vis-
ibility comes with risks for members of marginalized groups,11 controlled visibil-
ity through privacy protections has the potential to serve important antisubor-
dination goals and lead to broader societal participation of entire communities 
in the public square. Given that public space may deny the existence of nonnor-
mative identities, that participation may by itself be radical and politically trans-
formative.12 Robust privacy protections are a touchstone for empowering mem-
bers of different marginalized groups with the ability to participate safely in both 
the physical and digital public squares,13 while also preserving space for vibrant 
“subaltern counterpublics.”14 Such subaltern spaces can take the form of “en-
clave[s]” where “counterhegemonic ideas and strategies” are developed, or more 
outward-facing “counterpublic[s] which engage in debate with wider publics” 
in order to influence those publics.15 
Mitigating the exclusion of marginalized groups is by itself, of course, more 
than sufficient to normatively justify robust legal privacy protections. But the 
benefits of ensuring that marginalized groups can participate safely in the public 
sphere flow to everyone.16 Indeed, ensuring their participation is critical to a 
 
11. E.g., Morgan M. Page, One from the Vaults: Gossip, Access, and Trans History-Telling, in TRAP 
DOOR: TRANS CULTURAL PRODUCTION AND THE POLITICS OF VISIBILITY 135, 143 (Reina 
Gossett, Eric A. Stanley & Johanna Burton eds., 2017) (“As happened during previous periods 
of increased media visibility for trans people, we are currently experiencing a crackdown on 
the everyday lives of trans people by both the government and the general popula-
tion . . . . Visibility, this supposed cure-all, might actually be poison.”). 
12. Marquis Bey, The Trans*-ness of Blackness, the Blackness of Trans*-ness, 4 TSQ: TRANSGENDER 
STUD. Q. 275, 277 (2017) (explaining that because of “a hegemonic grammar that utterly dis-
allows the very possibility of transgender” in gender-normative spaces, the existence of 
“trans* and nonnormative bodies is, by virtue of their inhabitation of public space, radical” 
and that the same could hold true “with black bodies occupying space implicitly coded in and 
through whiteness”). 
13. SKINNER-THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 103 (emphasizing the role of surveillance in furthering 
subordination and exclusion of marginalized groups from civic participation). 
14. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy, 25/26 SOC. TEXT 56, 67 (1990); MICHAEL WARNER, PUBLICS AND COUNTER-
PUBLICS 57 (2002). 
15. Squires, supra note 1, at 448. 
16. Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (explaining that while, normatively, principles of racial equality 
ought to have formed the basis for desegregation, desegregation was likely aided by the fact 
that it began to serve the white majority’s political and economic purposes); Franks, supra 
note 8, at 430 (advocating for an “enlightened interest convergence” approach to privacy that 
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well-functioning democracy. Political and democratic theories—ranging from 
deliberative democracy17 to civic republicanism18 to agonistic pluralism19—un-
derscore (in different ways and with distinct points of emphasis) that ensuring 
space for the exchange of ideas and contestation in the informal public spheres 
where ideas and viewpoints are debated is not something to fear, but something 
to embrace.20 Friction creates fire, but not always in the form of hatred and po-
larization. Rather, it can fuel the forge where healthy communities and egalitar-
ian societies are melded. 
But privacy is a precondition for that democratic, participatory friction be-
cause it allows marginalized groups to be a part of the public, preventing fragile 
majority monocultures and exclusionary groupthink to take hold. And while pri-
vacy protections should be implemented top-down—that is, from the govern-
ment and other institutional powers, such as information capitalists21—mem-
bers of marginalized groups have for a long time created friction and materially 
enhanced their living conditions by developing their own methods of privacy, 
demonstrating its importance.22 That is, while privacy scholars have under-
scored privacy’s ability to enable participation, members of marginalized groups 
have used privacy itself to create agonist, participatory friction. They have done 
so by deploying obfuscation technologies that interfere with surveillance mech-
anisms;23 by wearing masks, head veils, and hoodies; and by using public re-
strooms that correspond with their gender expression or identity, rather than 
 
foregrounds the insights and experiences of marginalized groups, which will ensure that sur-
veillance’s manifold harms are fully dismantled for everyone). 
17. Deliberative democracy underscores the importance of rational deliberation by members of a 
polity as key to a functioning democracy. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 85 (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1991) (1962). 
18. Civic republicanism emphasizes the role of citizen participation as a check on government 
tyranny. PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DE-
MOCRACY 5 (2012). 
19. Agonistic pluralism foregrounds the role of horizontal contestation among different elements 
of society as a critical element of a functional public sphere. CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: 
THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 92 (2013). 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. Joshua Cohen & Archon Fung, Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere, in DIGITAL TECHNOL-
OGY AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 23, 43 (Lucy Bernholz, Hélène Landemore & Rob Reich eds., 
2021) (arguing that “[b]uilding a more democratic public sphere will require vigorous dem-
ocratically oriented and concerted action by, among others, governments, private companies, 
nongovernmental organizations, and citizens themselves”). 
22. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 520-25 (2019) (advocating for the 
creation of friction as a means of raising the operating costs for surveillance capitalists). 
23. See generally FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR PRI-
VACY AND PROTEST 8-42 (2015) (cataloguing examples of technological obfuscation). 
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their sex assigned at birth.24 As each of these examples shows, privacy perfor-
mances are participation through which marginalized groups challenge the ho-
mogeneity of the public square while protecting themselves from violence. 
Appreciating privacy’s manifold agonistic and participatory benefits, along 
with its expressive, First Amendment pedigree, will be a critical component of 
any efforts to rectify the problems besetting our public sphere.25 Privacy helps 
people from marginalized groups appear in public on their own terms by miti-
gating the surveillance tools used to track them, thereby avoiding the violence 
and harassment that surveillance enables. In turn, it helps them enrich and shape 
the public sphere through the inclusion of their identities26 and their ideas—
o�en through acts of surveillance resistance and privacy performances.27 
Marginalized groups’ efforts to maintain privacy operate as a form of fric-
tion-creating expression, shaping societal norms around privacy, identity, par-
ticipation, and modes of public self-expression. This is a benefit separate and 
apart from any subsequent agonistic insights that individuals will proffer once 
permitted greater access to the square. And that agonistic friction, if safeguarded 
through privacy protections, may also help decrease some of the dangerous po-
larization plaguing the American political landscape.28 
Or so this Essay argues in three parts. Part I briefly highlights some of the 
group-based harms of privacy violations. Part II expounds on how legal protec-
tions for privacy can enable marginalized communities to fully participate in and 
shape the public sphere, in turn helping our society live up to its democratic, 
pluralistic, and equitable potential. Part III concludes with a discussion of how 
understanding the agonistic, participatory role of privacy could influence current 
reform discussions around regulation of not just the internet, but of traditional 
public squares as well. 
 
24. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673, 1695-1720 (2017) 
(documenting acts of privacy resistance by members of different marginalized groups and 
characterizing such resistance as instances of performative, expressive privacy). 
25. James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value of Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 69 
(2003) (arguing that broader appreciation for privacy’s societal or public value as “necessary 
to the proper functioning of a democratic political system” will help advance legal privacy 
protections); Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 
385, 425 (2015) (underscoring that data-privacy violations cause social, not just individual, 
harms). 
26. Bey, supra note 12. 
27. Skinner-Thompson, supra note 24, at 1695-1720. 
28. See CHANTAL MOUFFE, FOR A LEFT POPULISM 22 (2018) (suggesting that engagement and con-
testation will more effectively combat right-wing extremism than will demonization). 
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i .  surveillance as exclusion  
Surveillance excludes.29 It pushes members of targeted communities—o�en 
from marginalized groups—out of the public square to avoid the devastating 
consequences of being surveilled, including state-sanctioned physical violence.30 
Surveillance thereby operates as a key mechanism for keeping “members of mar-
ginalized groups out of deliberative fora in which critical decisions are being 
made about problems that affect them,” excluding them from “spaces of political 
consequence.”31 
Perhaps counterintuitively, while marginalized groups are disproportion-
ately subjected to surveillance and privacy violations,32 such involuntary public-
ity can lead to less diversity in the public square.33 That is, while a privacy viola-
tion may create momentary visibility, it is not visibility that allows the privacy 
victim to control their public identity. Therefore, on balance, such violations de-
ter members of targeted groups from appearing in public on their own terms.34 
This contributes to the appearance of a homogenous society and conforming 
viewpoints—within effectively segregated, exclusionary communities—while 
 
29. Franks, supra note 8, at 431 (“The fear of surveillance inhibits individual freedoms of expres-
sion and association, which in turn undermines the possibility of an open and democratic 
society.”). 
30. Report of the Sentencing Project to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms 
of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance Regarding Racial Dispari-
ties in the United States Criminal Justice System, SENT’G PROJECT 3 (Mar. 2018), https://www
.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/UN-Report-on-Racial-Disparities
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHY7-5UTZ]. 
31. Seeta Peña Gangadharan, Digital Exclusion: A Politics of Refusal, in DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 21, at 113, 115 (discussing the effects of other means of exclu-
sion, such as geographical, informational, and material barriers to participation). 
32. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE POLICE, AND 
PUNISH THE POOR 6 (2018). 
33. Rebecca Green & Michele Gilman, The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme Privacy and 
Data Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 253, 260 (2018) (explaining that cer-
tain surveillance systems push people out of view, forcing invisibility that may, depending on 
the context, be harmful). 
34. BRYCE CLAYTON NEWELL, POLICE VISIBILITY: PRIVACY, SURVEILLANCE, AND THE FALSE PROMISE 
OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS 33 (2021) (explaining that “surveillance of public spaces also likely 
affects some categories of citizens disproportionately, with the potential for increasing stig-
matization and more frequent criminalization of those members of society who are already 
more visible”); cf. Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amend-
ment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 493-509 
(2015) (arguing that surveillance encourages individuals to conform their opinions to per-
ceived group norms). 
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further compounding political polarization35 and allowing society to ignore our 
collective responsibility to those that have been marginalized.36 
This Part analyzes three overlapping types of surveillance mechanisms that 
accomplish exclusion: privatized-technological surveillance, administrative sur-
veillance, and carceral surveillance. 
A. Privatized-Technological Surveillance 
As used here, privatized-technological surveillance refers to the use of a dig-
ital technology by private individuals or corporations to surveil physical public 
space or to privacy violations that occur online. 
For example, increasingly widespread privatized video surveillance of public 
space can be used to document a range of political and personal activities, in-
cluding entering an abortion clinic,37 participating in political canvassing,38 or 
attending a protest.39 Videos can then be posted on the internet, allowing those 
who appear in them to be identified through crowdsourcing or facial-recognition 
technology.40 Once identified, those individuals can subsequently be doxed and 
harassed online, pushing them from the digital public sphere and chilling their 
 
35. Benjamin R. Warner & Astrid Villamil, A Test of Imagined Contact as a Means to Improve Cross-
Partisan Feelings and Reduce Attribution of Malevolence and Acceptance of Political Violence, 84 
COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 447, 457-62 (2017) (documenting how even imagined contacts be-
tween members of different groups can reduce polarization); cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson, 
Sylvia A. Law & Hugh Baran, Marriage, Abortion, and Coming Out, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 
126, 134-38 (2016) (comparing the popularity of media portrayals of lesbian and gay people 
to the dearth of portrayals of people exercising reproductive freedom as a partial explanation 
for the advancement of gay rights and the erosion of reproductive rights). 
36. LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR, at xxi-xxii, 108, 288 (2009); Torin Monahan, Regu-
lating Belonging: Surveillance, Inequality, and the Cultural Production of Abjection, 10 J. CULTURAL 
ECON. 191, 192-95 (2017) (underscoring the state’s efforts “to invisibilize the homelessness 
problem,” thereby alleviating society of their “collective ethical responsibility” toward each 
other). 
37. Yochi J. Dreazen, Abortion Protestors Use Cameras, Raise New Legal Issues, Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. 
(May 28, 2002, 12:01 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1022539371607091560 
[https://perma.cc/YJ6Q-8C42]. 
38. Angela K. Evans, Initiatives Canvassers Report Harassment, BOULDER WKLY. (July 28, 2016), 
http://www.boulderweekly.com/news/initiatives-canvassers-report-harassment [https://
perma.cc/DB58-4ZL2]. 
39. Nellie Bowles, How ‘Doxxing’ Became a Mainstream Tool in the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxxing-protests.html [https:
//perma.cc/UW9E-5FFQ]. 
40. Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. 
33, 50-51 (2020) (explaining that facial-recognition technology threatens to chill the public 
actions of minority groups). 
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embodied physical participation.41 Although the relative anonymity of the public 
square once protected participation in such embodied activities,42 privatized 
technology has eroded it.43 
Privatized-technological surveillance can also constitute sexual harassment. 
Weak privacy tort laws44 and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
shield websites that host nonconsensual pornography from accountability.45 In 
doing so, they allow stigmatized images of women and queer folk to be used as 
weapons that shame both female sexuality and nonnormative gender identities 
and create obstacles to both gender and sexual minorities’ full enfranchisement 
in society, including employment barriers when current and potential employers 
view nonconsensual images.46 
Such examples of internet harassment underscore what Paul Schwartz pre-
dicted decades ago: without informational-privacy protections online, many 
people will decide not to participate in the digital public square, undermining 
the ability of the internet to function as a meaningful democratic forum.47 The 
harms of digital privacy violations thus reverberate back and forth into physical 
public space, undermining targets’ ability to participate as they desire in both 
political activities and quotidian activities essential to human flourishing, such 
as work. 
B. Administrative Surveillance 
Administrative surveillance is the use of government systems of classification 
and recordkeeping to surveil, control, and shape people’s lives and identities.48 
 
41. Micah Lee, How Right-Wing Extremists Stalk, Dox, and Harass Their Enemies, INTERCEPT (Sept. 
6, 2017, 5:24 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/09/06/how-right-wing-extremists-stalk-
dox-and-harass-their-enemies [https://perma.cc/8JGD-699E]. 
42. Cf. JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS 65-66 
(1990). 
43. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Recording as Heckling, 108 GEO. L.J. 125, 159-60 (2019). 
44. See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051, 2069-74 
(2018). 
45. Mary Anne Franks, Section 230 and the Anti-Social Contract, LAWFARE (Feb. 22, 2021, 10:36 
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/section-230-and-anti-social-contract [https://perma.cc
/UK5E-Z8ZF]. 
46. Anastasia Powell, Adrian J. Scott & Nicola Henry, Digital Harassment and Abuse: Experiences of 
Sexuality and Gender Minority Adults, 17 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 199, 215-17 (2020); CITRON, 
supra note 2, at 13-14. 
47. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1611, 1650. 
48. DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE 
LIMITS OF LAW 29 (2011) (explaining that “administrative norms or regularities create struc-
tured insecurity and (mal)distribute life chances across populations”). 
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In some jurisdictions, if a transgender or gender-variant person wants their 
name officially changed, they must file a court petition and publish the name 
change in a local newspaper, leaving public and o�en digital paper trails.49 Sim-
ilarly, some states forbid modification of the gender marker on someone’s birth 
certificate outright or require medical or surgical interventions before a person 
can obtain an accurate gender marker.50 These medical interventions may be in-
accessible or unneeded for many trans people.51 When an individual is asked to 
produce their birth certificate, intimate details regarding their body and gender 
identity may be revealed. This forced “outing” serves as a barrier to obtaining 
proper identification,52 which is a critical part of entering the public sphere on 
one’s own terms without being subjected to violence and harassment.53 
Administrative surveillance of those seeking state financial assistance is also 
pervasive and increasingly digitized, in what John Gilliom has described as the 
“digital poorhouse.”54 Under the pretense of ensuring that those seeking aid 
from means-tested programs meet the eligibility requirements, the government 
collects vast amounts of personal information about people’s lives, including 
their intimate relationships, sometimes through invasive home visits.55 In real-
ity, the questioning operates as a form of social control whereby the administra-
tive state polices the poor because it views them as morally suspect.56 Increas-
ingly, this information is aggregated and shared among government agencies 
(including, at times, law enforcement), rendering the lives of impoverished peo-
ple completely transparent to the government.57 
 
49. E.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 60-65 (McKinney 2021). 
50. Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender 
Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives of Transgender 
People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 400-01 (2013). 
51. Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for Transgender Student Ath-
letes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 291 (2013). 
52. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 192 (2015). 
53. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 754-57 (2008). 
54. JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRI-
VACY 35 (2001). 
55. Id. at 43. 
56. BRIDGES, supra note 8, at 9 (2017). 
57. See EUBANKS, supra note 32, at 121. 
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C. Carceral Surveillance 
And of course, carceral surveillance—the deployment of the state’s law-en-
forcement powers to document and criminalize a vast array of activity—also ex-
cludes marginalized groups.58  
Such surveillance in the form of police scrutiny of trans women of color and 
the criminalization of “walking while trans” further pushes trans people from 
the public square and into prison.59 Racial profiling, as embodied in New York 
City’s unconstitutional stop-and-frisk policy, targets Black and Brown people 
and renders them subject to search and arrest merely for their presence in par-
ticular overpoliced neighborhoods.60 Immigrant profiling, such as the unconsti-
tutional Arizona Senate Bill 1070, authorized local law enforcement officers to 
arrest anyone without a warrant if the officers had probable cause to believe that 
they were removable under federal immigration law.61 This policy served to 
brand people as suspicious and criminal based on the color of their skin or their 
ability to speak English. Such profiling (which continues notwithstanding inter-
mittent court victories)62 deters racial, immigrant, and gender minorities from 
entering the public square lest they be observed, searched, and arrested. 
Anticamping or sit-lie laws are another example of carceral surveillance. 
These laws criminalize the presence of homeless people in public by forbidding 
them from creating makeshi� shelters on public land or even lying down in pub-
lic space, empowering the government to destroy people’s dwellings and invade 
their privacy.63 This pushes homeless people away from central public spaces to 
remote and undesirable corners (such as underpasses or woods) where they are 
further isolated from sources of sustenance and public participation and where 
 
58. Cf. WACQUANT, supra note 36, at 41 (explaining that a penal state has gradually replaced a 
welfare state, further criminalizing marginalized groups). 
59. Leonore F. Carpenter & R. Barrett Marshall, Walking While Trans: Profiling of Transgender 
Women by Law Enforcement, and the Problem of Proof, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5, 5-6 
(2017). 
60. See Floyd v. City of New York., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding New York City’s 
stop-and-frisk policy unconstitutional). 
61. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (ruling that federal law preempted three of 
the four provisions of Arizona Senate Bill 1070). 
62. E.g., Alice Speri, The NYPD Is Still Stopping and Frisking Black People at Disproportionate Rates, 
INTERCEPT (June 10, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2021/06/10/stop-and-frisk-
new-york-police-racial-disparity [https://perma.cc/SU9Z-QQFY]. 
63. E.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE § 38-86.2 (2021) (prohibiting unauthorized camp-
ing); S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 2, § 168(b) (2021) (prohibiting sitting or lying down on 
public sidewalks during the day). 
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they are ignored and forgotten.64 Indeed, laws regulating public space criminal-
ize the very existence of homeless people—an exclusion that Jeremy Waldron has 
described as “one of the most callous and tyrannical exercises of power in mod-
ern times by a (comparatively) rich and complacent majority against a minority 
of their less fortunate fellow human beings.”65 
With the proliferation of digitized criminal records66 and online mugshot 
databases,67 once a person is criminalized, they are always criminalized. Indeed, 
the policing of physical space follows people online in perpetuity. This digital 
documentation of the criminalization of certain identities within public space al-
lows potential employers, landlords, or social connections to learn of people’s 
interactions with law enforcement68—interactions that may well have been the 
product of racist, transphobic, and xenophobic police practices. And, much like 
facial recognition technology, the digitized criminal-record databases may not 
always be accurate, and can include individuals who are not ultimately convicted 
but merely arrested.69 
*    *    * 
These examples of privatized-technological, administrative, and carceral sur-
veillance illustrate that privacy violations are not only felt by the individuals be-
ing surveilled at any given moment (significant as that individual impact is). 
Privacy violations also systematically operate as a form of social control that 
helps prop up hegemonic forces of white supremacy, patriarchy, heteronorma-
tivity, and neoliberalism—while subjugating different marginalized groups, ren-
dering them abject.70 As powerfully put by Torin Monahan: 
 
64. Donald Saelinger, Note, Nowhere to Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances Criminalizing Home-
lessness, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 545, 556-60 (2006). 
65. Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 301-02 (1991). 
66. Sarah Esther Lageson, The Purgatory of Digital Punishment, SLATE (June 24, 2020, 10:59 AM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/06/criminal-justice-records-online-digital-punish-
ment.html [https://perma.cc/8VUV-H8ZK]. 
67. E.g., FIND MUGSHOTS, https://www.findmugshots.com [https://perma.cc/C637-TK5B]. 
68. David Segal, Mugged by a Mug Shot Online, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes
.com/2013/10/06/business/mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html [https://perma.cc/VLF8-
KPTT]. 
69. Marina Duane, Nancy G. La Vigne, Mathew Lynch & Emily Reimal, Criminal Background 
Checks: Impact on Employment and Recidivism, URB. INST., at V (2017), https://www.ur-
ban.org/research/publication/criminal-background-checks-impact-employment-and-recid-
ivism/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/XR65-WRSM]; Nicole Weissman & Marina 
Duane, Five Problems with Criminal Background Checks, URB INST.: URB. WIRE (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/five-problems-criminal-background-checks [https://
perma.cc/R5M5-9JPV]; see also Hill, supra note 7 (documenting a series of wrongful arrests 
based on facial recognition technology). 
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Surveillance plays an important role in policing bodies and maintaining 
boundaries between inside and outside, self and other. Moments of un-
wanted visibility or presence—of the poor, the homeless, the refugee—
seem to compel mechanisms of intensified control. Such control mecha-
nisms delineate parameters of temporary existence for the compliant, 
while excluding those marked as dangerous or socially illegible. There-
fore, through categorization and sorting, surveillance enacts forms of 
structural and symbolic violence against marginalized Others.71 
Consequently, social efforts to create a more just and equitable society must 
include commitments to privacy protections—including agonistic privacy per-
formances—along with drastic reductions of the state- and private-surveillance 
infrastructure. 
i i .  privacy as agonistic participation  
In contrast to the o�en-exclusionary impact of surveillance, legal safeguards 
for individual privacy help people be seen and heard on their own terms, allow-
ing them to contribute to the social tableau and democratic governance. While 
it has many different patinas, any definition of a functioning democracy depends 
on meaningful participation of the people.72 Such participation can occur in in-
formal fora or formal representative ones. But whether it be deliberative democ-
racy, agonistic pluralism, or even civic republicanism, popular participation is 
the linchpin of many theories of democracy.73 
Democratic theories may differ in terms of the emphasis they place on how 
and why participation matters, but they almost all agree that it does. For exam-
ple, deliberative democracy o�en foregrounds the role of rational consensus as a 
critical goal of public participation.74 As leading scholar of deliberative 
 
71. Id. at 192. 
72. Mike Ananny has observed: 
Although the term participation is central to much of democratic theory, it is still 
highly contingent and debatable in both form and aims. It means different things 
in different contexts, o�en presumes different democratic ideals, and carries with 
it different assumptions about what role individual and collective actions play in 
democratic institutions. 
Mike Ananny, Presence of Absence: Exploring the Democratic Significance of Silence, in DIGITAL 
TECHNOLOGY AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 21, at 141, 154. My goal here is not to re-
solve these debates (a tall order), but rather to underscore the role of privacy in both facilitat-
ing and directly serving as a form of agonistic participation (however defined). 
73. See supra notes 17-19 for definitions of each theory. 
74. For a thorough yet succinct overview of theories of deliberative democracy and their short-
comings, see EDWINA BARVOSA, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY NOW 1-16 (2018). 
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democracy Jurgen Habermas described, the effectiveness of civil society and de-
liberative democracy historically “stood or fell with the principle of universal ac-
cess. A public sphere from which specific groups would be . . . excluded was less 
than merely incomplete; it was not a public sphere at all.”75 
In contrast to deliberative democracy’s emphasis on consensus building, civic 
republicanism centers on what Philip Pettit describes as a “contestatory citi-
zenry”—one that is “committed to interrogating all the elements of government 
and imposing itself in the determination of law and policy” to ensure that the 
government does not become totalitarian.76 In other words, contestatory partic-
ipation under a republican model underscores the role of participation aimed at 
the government itself (i.e., vertically). 
Like civic republicanism, agonistic pluralism distinguishes itself from delib-
erative democracy by underscoring the value of contention over consensus.77 But 
under an agonistic pluralist veneer, participation in the public square is critical 
because “the public space is where conflicting points of view are confronted 
without any possibility of a final reconciliation.”78 Horizontal tension (among 
the people and corporatist, neoliberal powers) is acceptable—and indeed neces-
sary—because the lack of reconciliation can underscore the hegemonic forces op-
erating with the public square and can also help ensure continued vigilance in 
the face of many ultimately short-term political victories.79 Or, as put by Chantal 
Mouffe, an agonistic approach to public discourse “consists in making visible 
what the dominant consensus tends to obscure and obliterate, in giving a voice 
to all those are silenced within the framework of the existing hegemony.”80 
In short, Habermas emphasized the purported role of rational decisionmak-
ing within the deliberative process; Pettit and Mouffe underscore the importance 
 
75. HABERMAS, supra note 17, at 85. 
76. PETTIT, supra note 18, at 5. 
77. MOUFFE, supra note 19, at 92 (“And what distinguishes the agonistic approach to the public 
space from other approaches? Its main characteristic is that it challenges the widespread view 
that, albeit in different ways, informs most visions of the public space. According to the ex-
pected view, the public space is the terrain where one aims at creating consensus.”). 
78. Id. 
79. BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 14-15, 205 (2016) 
(underscoring that while the “perpetuity of contest is not easy to celebrate,” it serves as a realist 
recognition that political contests “engender remainders and that, if those remainders are not 
engaged, they may return to haunt and destabilize” the contests that were mistakenly believed 
to be settled or closed, with the displacement of contestation as disempowering the most mar-
ginalized identities who stand to benefit from further contestation). 
80. MOUFFE, supra note 28, at 17 (explaining that “[o]ne of the fundamental symbolic pillars of 
the democratic ideal—the power of the people—has been undermined because post-politics 
eliminates the possibility of an agonistic struggle between different projects of society which 
is the very condition for the exercise of popular sovereignty”). 
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of contestation or agonism as a key characteristic of participatory deliberations. 
But a core tenant unifying all these theories is popular sovereignty through par-
ticipation by the people, suggesting that unless we safeguard such participation, 
we risk undermining our democracy altogether. 
And as privacy-law scholars have noted, actionable legal rights against pri-
vacy incursions serve as a critical first-order right by helping people access and 
influence the public square—both physical and digital—in a meaningful way. For 
example, as Paul Schwartz powerfully argued, without strong privacy protec-
tions, “cyberspace’s civic potential will never be attained.”81 According to 
Schwartz, lack of privacy on the internet both (1) “discourage[s] unfettered par-
ticipation in deliberative democracy” and (2) “can harm an individual’s capacity 
for self-governance,” limiting meaningful contributions to public discussion.82 
As Schwartz highlighted, privacy aids deliberative democracy because without 
it, “the underlying capacity of individuals to form and act on their notions of the 
good” are limited and chilled, and surveillance also chills the coming together of 
communities to hash out their views.83 Relatedly, as detailed by Julie Cohen, 
privacy violations “harm individuals, but not only individuals” in that they also 
quash “[d]ynamic, emergent subjectivity—the sort of subjectivity upon which 
liberal democracy and innovation both rely.”84 According to Cohen, unencum-
bered surveillance will prevent individuals from having “the ability to form and 
pursue meaningful agendas for human flourishing.”85 Or, as characterized by 
Neil Richards, privacy is necessary to incubate new ideas and foster intellectual 
freedom, in turn advancing democratically supported First Amendment speech 
values.86 In short, as put by Joel Reidenberg, “Privacy is fundamental to consti-
tutional democracy affecting a citizen’s ability to participate in deliberative de-
mocracy and to engage in robust governing dialogues.”87 
In addition to privacy’s instrumental role in fostering identity and ideas and 
facilitating subsequent democratic participation, efforts to maintain privacy can 
themselves serve as a form of agonistic friction and participation, as many 
 
81. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1611. 
82. Id. at 1647. 
83. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation 
in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 560-61 (1995). 
84. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906 (2013). 
85. Id. at 1912. 
86. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408-25 (2008). 
87. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 141, 152 (2014); see also Joel R. 
Reidenberg, The Transparent Citizen, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 437, 449 (2015) (“The overexposure 
of citizens reduces the checks and balances on the exercise of government powers and dimin-
ishes citizens’ trust and commitment to law.”). 
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members of different marginalized groups have demonstrated.88 That is, while 
privacy scholars have rightly emphasized privacy’s role in enabling participation, 
less emphasis has been placed on how privacy performances are participation. 
For Hong Kong civil-rights protestors, for example, wearing masks both al-
lows them to evade facial recognition technology and effect a participatory cri-
tique of the surveillance regime.89 Similarly, wearing a hoodie can signal a refusal 
to be surveilled, particularly by Black people who are disproportionately subject 
to surveillance. Indeed, wearing a hoodie is o�en read by the state as an expres-
sive statement of resistance.90 Relatedly, people of any gender may subvert gen-
der surveillance by refusing to comply with and be outed by restrictive gender-
identification laws or other laws that enforce sex or gender stereotypes. In this 
context, noncompliance keeps aspects of a people’s gender-related identities pri-
vate, and simultaneously operates as a performative disavowal of the state’s abil-
ity to surveil and define queer bodies.91 Indeed, the state understands privacy 
performances as a form of expressive, participatory resistance, and it has specif-
ically targeted efforts to maintain privacy by imposing additional regulation or 
criminalization. Consider, for example, the so-called Unmasking Antifa legisla-
tion introduced in Congress targeting protestors who wear “intimidat[ing]” 
masks,92 in addition to the application of antimask laws of much older vintages 
to civil-rights protestors.93 
These privacy performances are acts of expressive resistance to surveillance 
regimes that “communicate and signal opprobrium of surveillance, shine a 
 
88. For discussion of how principles of agonism or contestation should be incorporated into the 
design state of machine-learning processes to better protect privacy and overdetermination 
by algorithmic decisionmaking, see Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection from the Incom-
putable Self: From Agnostic to Agonistic Machine Learning, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 83 
(2019). 
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F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 16-CV-00236) (arguing that North Carolina’s bath-
room bill, H.B. 2, invades the privacy of transgender people, exposing them to harassment 
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92. Unmasking Antifa Act of 2019, H.R. 4003, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019). 
93. Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to Anony-
mous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 848-50 (2013) (docu-
menting several examples of antimask laws); SKINNER-THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 69-70 
(discussing application of antimask laws to antiracism protestors). 
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critical spotlight on that surveillance, and in so doing, offer a reimagined place 
for privacy in our social structures.”94 They are an embodied example of what 
Bernard Harcourt might label “critical praxis,”95 or what Judith Butler character-
izes as the 
plural and performative right to appear, one that asserts and instates the 
body in the midst of the political field, and which, in its expressive and 
signifying function, delivers a bodily demand for a more livable set of 
economic, social, and political conditions no longer afflicted by induced 
forms of precarity.96 
Put differently by Seeta Peña Gangadharan in her work on the willful (as op-
posed to coerced) self-exclusion of different marginalized groups from domi-
nant modes of tech-based interactions, “when marginalized people refuse tech-
nologies, they imagine new ways of being and relating to one another in a 
technologically mediated society.”97 
So conceived, privacy performances are an embodied example of agonistic 
participation that, pursuant to contestatory theories of participation, form a crit-
ical component of democracy in action. As noted above, under agonistic, plural-
ist conceptions of participatory democracy, “a central task of democratic politics 
is to provide the institutions which will permit conflicts to take an ‘agonistic’ 
form, where the opponents are not enemies but adversaries among whom exists 
a conflictual consensus.”98 Without such confrontation of political positions, 
“there is always the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced 
by a confrontation between nonnegotiable moral values or essentialist forms of 
identifications.”99 Paradoxically, according to Mouffe, “[t]oo much emphasis on 
consensus, together with aversion towards confrontations, leads to apathy and 
to a dissatisfaction with political participation.”100 As “cultural and artistic prac-
tices,” privacy performances “can play a critical role by fostering agonistic public 
 
94. SKINNER-THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 62. 
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spaces where counter-hegemonic struggles could be launched against neo-lib-
eral hegemony.”101 
Appreciating privacy’s directly participatory or agonistic role is critical be-
cause it provides a powerful normative reason to protect privacy as participation. 
It can also shi� perceptions of privacy performances from suspicious to time-
honored expressive practices.102 In the current polarized public square, both the 
state and many private individuals demonize antisurveillance practices and asso-
ciate them with criminal behavior.103 Understanding privacy performance/re-
sistance as participatory, expressive engagement could help ratchet down the 
rhetoric and appreciate such practices for what they o�en are: principled efforts 
to shape the public sphere as one hospitable to all kinds of different identities 
and ideas.104 So while privacy scholars have long appreciated that privacy mat-
ters in that it enables participation, it is just as important to understand that 
privacy can operate as a form of agonistic participation in and of itself—privacy 
is an end, not just a means, of participation. 
i i i .  implications for reform  
Better appreciating that privacy serves not just as an instrumental tool or 
precondition for democratic participation, but also as a form of agonistic partic-
ipation itself that shapes public values and norms has several implications for 
current privacy-reform discussions. 
In particular, the participatory-privacy paradigm provides a powerful riposte 
to those who rely on a simplistic and formalistic approach to the First Amend-
ment and its role as democratic lodestar. As widely documented and critiqued, 
deregulatory agendas have been advanced by formalist and reductionist ap-
proaches to the First Amendment wherein a vast array of conduct is characterized 
as speech or speech-facilitating. If taken to the extreme, such conduct, under-
stood as expression, would be largely insulated from government regulation.105 
This approach, known variously as First Amendment Lochnerism,106 the 
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Imperial First Amendment,107 or the weaponized First Amendment,108 has been 
deployed in contexts ranging from challenges to LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination 
laws109 to consumer protection legislation,110 but is also increasingly raised to 
combat modest privacy protections. 
For example, surveillance companies like Clearview AI invoke First Amend-
ment Lochnerism to defend their practice of scraping social-media photos to 
train facial-recognition so�ware, which they then hawk to law-enforcement 
agencies.111 According to Clearview AI, the practice is a form of information 
gathering protected by the First Amendment.112 But to the extent the First 
Amendment o�en operates as a constitutional shorthand for all manner of key 
ingredients for meaningful democracy,113 understanding that people who assert 
their right to obscure their identity from Clearview AI and other surveillance 
capitalists are engaged in an act of agonistic expression helps to provide a com-
pelling government justification for regulating privacy-invading actions.114 
Given the Supreme Court’s sensitivity to social context in determining whether 
conduct is expressive or symbolic speech,115 a strong argument can be made that 
those who seek to guard aspects of their identity through privacy resistance (be 
it through online obfuscation techniques, physical barriers, or the like) are en-
gaged in an expressive enterprise, one that rebukes widespread surveillance. 
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circumstances” in determining whether conduct is expressive). 
the yale law journal forum November 16, 2021 
472 
Similarly, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which states that 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information con-
tent provider,”116 has o�en been interpreted broadly by courts to provide blanket 
immunity to platforms or websites for hosting hateful, discriminatory, or pri-
vacy-invading messages.117 This immunity is defended as a key adjuvant to the 
First Amendment and as a critical means of fostering speech online. According 
to Section 230 defenders, if internet platforms (ranging from Facebook to web-
sites hosting revenge pornography) could be held liable for the acts of website 
users, then the platforms would not exist and the internet’s speech potential 
would be curtailed.118 For this reason, Section 230 is o�en regarded as “a kind of 
sacred cow—an untouchable protection of near-constitutional status.”119 
But as scholars and advocates such as Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne 
Franks have underscored, that unfettered immunity—supposedly needed to fa-
cilitate a robust digital public sphere—has also been used to silence, shame, and 
humiliate many people from marginalized groups (including women and queer 
folk), pushing them from the public square.120 As explained by Olivier Sylvain, 
the broad construction of Section 230 that currently prevails among courts “ef-
fectively underwrites content that foreseeably targets the most vulnerable among 
us.”121 As debates about legislatively amending or judicially reexamining Sec-
tion 230 grow, understanding the role of agonistic participation in creating 
meaningful democratic exchange and privacy in facilitating that participation 
can buttress calls for reform. Holding accountable certain pernicious websites 
(such as those that directly encourage and profit from harassment) would en-
courage platforms to change their practices and more robustly scrutinize the 
harmful and hateful content they host. Just as a broader view of privacy’s dem-
ocratic function could justify regulating surveillance companies like Clearview 
AI, a broader, less formalist view of the democratic values that internet-platform 
regulation serves could justify Section 230 reform. 
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As a final example, laws that force the economically subjugated from the 
public square, such as anticamping laws, rely on the faulty notion that there 
ought to be no right to privacy in public.122 We might instead understand some-
one who establishes a makeshi� home on public property as engaging in ago-
nistic, participatory privacy.123 Such a home affords its inhabitant a modest de-
gree of privacy from the public, while simultaneously putting economic 
inequality and social precarity on full display. Penalizing people for constructing 
makeshi� homes and existing in public space could then be understood as an 
affront to First Amendment participatory values. Similar arguments were prof-
fered in the context of organized camping movements, such as Occupy.124 They 
are just as applicable to individualized, agonistic efforts at survival and refusal to 
be cast out of public view. 
iv.  conclusion  
A deeper appreciation for privacy’s role in both facilitating participation and 
being a form of participation could help transform it from a boogeyman for those 
suggesting that people with nothing to hide have nothing to fear into a critical 
component of our democracy. In turn, this shi� would help justify regulations 
that would truly make the physical public square and digital public square equi-
table and democratic spaces, open to all. It may also decrease polarization by re-
ducing the segregation of both digital and physical spaces, leading to greater 
points of interaction and providing for candid, yet compassionate, exchanges of 
views. 
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